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[Appearing below are excerpts from a recently completed introductory chapter to the Japanese
edition of David Barkin's book, "Distorted Development: Mexico in the World Economy." Distorted
Development was published by Westview Press (Boulder, Colorado) in 1990. Barkin, professor
of economics at the Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana's Xochimilco campus and Centro de
Ecodesarrollo research director, is a North American economist who has been working in Mexico for
decades. The second part of "Salinastroika..." will be published in the 08/19/92 issue of SourceMex.]
Mexico has become the wunderkind of the Western world, a showcase of neo-liberal economic
reform. But behind the quantitative success are the unmistakable signs of economic decline and
social neglect. In the past two years, the Mexican government has adeptly forged an alliance of
domestic and foreign interests which glorifies its contribution to reshaping international economic
relations in the western hemisphere. The cornerstone of the government's international economic
policy has been the official initiative to recast North America by extending the Canada-US free
trade area to include Mexico and then to permeate the rest of Latin American economic space. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), under negotiation since 1990, is an essential
instrument in this restructuring. This concerted effort by the three governments to irreversibly
modify productive and social structures has evoked a remarkable groundswell of opposition
from new trilateral alliances of grassroots groups from many different sectors as well as broad
national coalitions. As the negotiations advanced, grassroots opposition has found unaccustomed
allies. Mexican business groups from a broad range of industries are beginning to realize that
the hardships faced by Canadian counterparts probably offer a taste of things to come in Mexico.
Similarly, the recent decision by the US Supreme Court to vindicate the abduction of a Mexican
citizen by US police forces acting abroad reinforces the fears of human rights groups in the three
countries. In the light of recent history, the NAFTA's promise of higher incomes, more employment
and cleaner environments seems more like a utopian pipedream, or a politician's campaign rhetoric,
than an achievable goal. Mexico of the 1990s is becoming more like Huxley's Brave New World
than King Arthur's Camelot. Salinastroika Shortly after his inauguration, Carlos Salinas de Gortari
undertook a series of bold moves which galvanized Mexican society and sparked the imagination
of the leaders of the world's capitalist nations. Attempting to throw off the cloud tainting his claim
to electoral victory, the new president unseated several despotic leaders of Mexico's most corrupt
industrial unions; ordered important business leaders jailed for fraud; and underwrote a new social
pact which contributed to the precipitous decline of workers' standard of living, and the shrinkage
of purchasing power among the middle class whose expectations are still bolstered by a cultural
barrage promoting consumerism. In the spirit of the times, "Salinastroika" was compared favorably
with Gorbachev's earthshaking reform program. Perestroika injected fresh air into the global search
for new solutions to global problems in the mid-1980s. In addition to a profound critique of the
existing system, the Soviet premier offered a program of radical changes for a stagnating society
and economy. This program, which Gorbachev claimed was the logical extension of the high ideals
of the 1917 Revolution, sparked a series of far-reaching political and economic transformations.
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Unfortunately, it seems more appropriate to compare the Mexican situation with the economic
decline and social chaos of the post-Gorbachev era, rather than the perestroika political program.
While the western world rejoiced in the triumph of capitalism, foreign entrepreneurs joined a
privileged few in the former Soviet republics to begin restructuring society for their own benefit,
eliminating the multiplicity of autocratic processes which rigidly constrained individual initiative
and creativity. The revelers promised that in a short period of time, they would unleash the vast
natural wealth and extraordinary human potential locked up behind the iron curtain. Serious
concerns expressed by some thoughtful sectors of Soviet society were dismissed. The reformers
began unraveling the vast array of social institutions which offered a safety net, guaranteeing
every segment of society minimum access to food, shelter, and social services, and protecting them
from the social horrors of destitution caused by unemployment, illness, or old age. Similarly, the
Mexican stabilization program reshaped the government apparatus and unleashed individual
initiative. The results were apparent almost immediately. With the drop in inflation as a result of
government spending cutbacks and declining real wages, interest rates plunged, and the federal
budget went into surplus. Investor confidence rose as the administration offered guarantees and
jumped headlong into NAFTA negotiations. Export oriented foreign investment and industrial
modernization further stimulated the domestic market. Mexico offered spectacular returns on
financial investments, and an expanding domestic market for consumer goods based on the upper
layers of society. Foreign franchisers and retailers joined with local entrepreneurs and established
chains to cater to approximately 15 million consumers (industrial workers, established merchants,
commercial farmers, and diverse professionals). Meanwhile, the vast majority of Mexicans cannot
participate in the bonanza. Real wages earned by most Mexicans continue to decline and absolute
poverty is spreading. Public spending on education, medical care and other social services and
formal employment opportunities are woefully inadequate. After the political debacle of the 1988
elections, the chief executive embarked on a program of democratization. The ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) attempted to provide more opportunity for local autonomy, while election
laws were modified to assure some modicum of participation by opposition parties in the legislative
process. Some minimal safeguards and external checks and balances opened campaigns and the
voting ceremony to scrutiny and debate. A National Human Rights Commission was established
and proved more independent than its creators might have dreamed, while a growing political
debate stimulated more grassroots organizing and participation than the country has witnessed
in recent history. Democratization, however, is not easily achieved. Continuous regional political
battles during the past three years demonstrate that the mere establishment of trappings does not
guarantee the substance of democracy. The Mexican State, and its system of overlapping provincial
elites, is very much concerned with defending control of the nation's wealth and power. The
economic reorganization offers too many opportunities for individual enrichment to expect existing
elites to voluntarily share privileged access to national wealth. In only a few instances has the State
begrudgingly ceded control to the moderate opposition. The PRI staunchly defends its hegemony
against the populist left PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party), led by the son of former president
Lazaro Cardenas, who forged a populist and socialist tradition by nationalizing the nation's oil
reserves and implementing a massive agrarian reform (1934-1940). The PRI has mobilized the entire
panoply of government institutions and resources to persuade citizens of bountiful rewards in
return for support at the ballot box. The key 1992 gubernatorial elections reflected the effective
exercise of political power to purchase a political weal. Impact of economic reform program Since
1982, the Mexican economy has been profoundly reorganized. The Lopez Portillo government was
forced to sharply devalue the peso after the western industrial nations successfully forced down
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the price of petroleum. Unfortunate investment decisions and poorly conceived economic policies
further aggravated the country's problems, forcing the government to suspend foreign debt service
payments, precipitating in large measure the world debt crisis. A mid-term (1985) change in public
policy firmly positioned the de la Madrid administration on the path of neo-liberal reconstruction.
Some of the most salient features of the new society resulting from the program are summarized
below. 1) A changing incomes policy. The 1982 peso devaluation and inflation in subsequent years
contributed to a dramatic decline in real wages. With the imposition of the Economic Stabilization
Pacts beginning in 1987, the decline was slowed somewhat, but by mid-1992, the real minimum
wage had been reduced to about 65% of 1960 levels, and 25% of the 1976 average. The Social
Security Institute has reported that industrial sector wages during the early 1990s averaged about
1.8 minimum wages. Workers in many commercial agricultural regions were earning about 1.5 times
the minimum. In 1988, the basic market basket of consumer goods required for a typical worker's
household cost about 4.78 times the minimum. Extreme poverty for an average household is defined
at less than 2.72 times the minimum wage. According to 1990 census figures, 60% of Mexican
households were below the extreme poverty threshold. The incomes of 72.4% of all households were
below 4 times the minimum. 2) Differential sectoral growth in industry. With the changes in the
wage structure, the domestic market contracted dramatically. As part of the adjustment process,
the new policy explicitly promotes export production rather than goods for the local market. The
major beneficiaries of this new approach were the automobile and computer industries and the
maquiladora or export platform assembly plants. The maquiladora industry expanded at a rapid
pace from 1982 to 1992, by taking advantage of special legislation bestowing privileged tax treatment
on certain exports to the US. By 1992, more than 2,000 plants employing about 480,000 people were
in operation. Growth in 1992 has slowed down, result of economic recession in the US. Automobile
production soon became the mainstay of Mexican industry. Emerging from the doldrums of a
stagnant or declining local market, the industry was repositioned to play a dynamic role in the US
market. During the 1980s the large automakers decided to reorient production of cars and auto
parts towards export. Maquila production of automobile parts also expanded. Existing assembly
operations were modernized and automated. By the end of the decade, the government provided
an additional stimulus for the automotives industry by boosting domestic demand in a number of
ways. Perhaps the most important was an easy credit policy which induced people to purchase new
vehicles via offers of special banking facilities, credit pools, and mutual self-financing schemes.
Environmental considerations led to a program for the rapid replacement of old private taxis and
collective transport vehicles (e.g., minibuses and VW vans) in Mexico City. The "one day without
a car" program led many people to acquire another vehicle aimed at circumventing the program's
intent, or reducing automobile traffic. Foreign investment and the spread of new marketing systems
also contributed to increased demand. The electronic equipment industry in general, and computers
in particular, also enjoyed dynamic growth. For years, the maquila sector had been exporting
parts for electronic apparatuses and consumer appliances. After the onset of the crisis, specific
support was offered for integrating the production of finished products in Mexico. An important
signal was sent out to foreign manufacturers when the government approved IBM's application
for 100% ownership of a new installation, a policy change which was soon to be extended to many
other industrial sectors. The government stimulated domestic demand for computers through
credit and training programs which offered users easier access to new equipment and encouraged
businesses to begin to seriously consider integrating electronic data processing and even production
control techniques into their operations. Government itself also became a major buyer of electronic
equipment as part of modernization and streamlining programs. Traditional manufacturing
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industries stagnated or declined. With the drastic contraction in purchasing power of the middle
and working classes and the dramatic opening of consumer markets to imports, many producers of
non-durable consumer goods and some durables were displaced by imports. Inexpensive imports
flooded the mass consumption markets, while upscale shopping centers offered affluent consumers
the opportunity to acquire in Mexico goods for which they formerly made pilgrimages to the elite
malls of California or Texas. On balance, the industrial labor force is smaller than a decade ago.
Although about 600,000 new jobs were created in the growth sectors, an almost equal number
became redundant in declining industries and in sectors which underwent thorough restructuring.
3) Balance of payments. Traditionally, the balance of payments is a leading indicator of the health of
the Mexican economy. At present, Mexico is running huge trade deficits, and the peso is overvalued
by an estimated 28%. Government economists repeatedly assert that the growing trade deficit is
no cause for concern. Their arguments can be summarized as follows: 1) imports of intermediate
and capital goods have grown: 2) the public sector is generating a surplus on current account and
private imports are financed by the banking system; 3) non-traditional manufactures exports are
quite dynamic; 4) inflows of private investment funds are more than adequate to finance the deficit;
and 5) foreign exchange reserves are at an all-time high. Independent analysts, however, counter
that many of these same features should be a cause for concern. For instance, a substantial part of
the import bill (including intermediate goods) is destined for an affluent minority, i.e., to substitute
mass consumption production by Mexican industries which have been driven out of business. Next,
the auto industry accounts for much of non-traditional export growth, but the same industry has
been generating a trade deficit, as the value of parts imports incorporated into finished products
surpasses export earnings. Critics point out that most foreign capital was channeled into highyield government securities and the Mexican stock exchange. The same investment can easily
be taken out of the country in the event of declining interest rates, loss of confidence, or better
returns elsewhere. Witness the stock market decline in June 1992, and resulting capital flight.
Finally, foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to cover less than six months worth of imports,
and are insignificant in the context of the threat of capital flight. The dependence on foreign direct
investment is also troublesome. In a rare public speech in mid-1992, Jose Cordoba, President
Salinas' chief economic adviser, said that Mexico will require over US$15 billion per annum over the
next decade in order to maintain the present momentum. He was not sanguine about the chances
of sustaining a flow of this magnitude, given the dynamics of the Mexican economy and competing
investment opportunities in the world economy over the rest of the 1990s. The implication is that
Mexican financiers will have to begin transferring resources from speculative and commercial
investments to productive projects, and that the very high propensity to import will have to be
reduced. Both of these changes would require profound changes in policy and behavior which are
contrary to commitments evolving out of the NAFTA negotiations. 4) Employment. The Mexican
government boasts of low unemployment rates. Periodic surveys show national rates of less than
3%, while a few cities report more than 5%. In a country where poverty is increasing, nutritional
standards are declining and migration is a permanent feature of the labor market, such reports may
seem unrealistic. Certain details from the surveys help put this information into perspective. More
than 25% of the labor force works less than 35 hours a week, and a surprising 5% of the employed
reported that they worked without spending any time on the job! Low unemployment rates are also
the product of a social system which offers no welfare services or insurance for the unemployed.
Mexicans are eking out an existence in the burgeoning services and commercial sectors, where poor
and unproductive rejects from the rest of the economy must compete. The restructuring of industrial
and agricultural production forces people into the service sector and the agricultural migrant
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labor force in Mexico, and into a broad range of jobs in the US. The ranks of itinerant and semifixed merchants in the urban areas are now so large that these groups constitute a major political
force, often displacing established commercial interests. The rural employment picture is more
complicated. On the one hand, many regions report an actual labor shortage to continue traditional
agricultural activities. Off-farm employment has grown to such an extent that during peak labor
demand periods (for preparing the land and harvesting), people can no longer easily take a leave
to attend the demands of the farm, and then return to their jobs. As a result, although vast tracts
of rain-fed land are no longer cultivated, farmers without access to investment capital cannot raise
yields sufficiently to warrant people risking their jobs to bring in the harvest. In contrast, temporary
employment opportunities abound in commercial, export-oriented fruit and vegetable production.
Brigades of "swallows" about 4 million migrant workers travel from region to region in search of
work as different crops mature, earning only a precarious existence and exposing themselves and
relatives to the worst horrors of agrochemical and gastrointestinal poisoning. Every year millions
of Mexicans decide to risk their lives attempting to cross the US border in search of work. Although
the US Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 enabled over 2 million Mexicans to legalize
their US residency, and was aimed at controlling the flow of undocumented workers, as many as 5
million Mexicans are now estimated to be working in the US. This outlet for the more adventurous
workers provides an important supplement to individual incomes and reduces social tensions
throughout Mexican society. Workers in the US also represent a net inflow of about US$5 billion
a year in foreign exchange. Although it is a continuing source of friction in bilateral relations, this
part of the labor market has become an essential ingredient in the Mexican government's domestic
economic stabilization planning process. 5) Privatization. Over the past two decades, the public
sector had grown to elphantine proportions, and rationalization was needed. The government built
basic industries and services to promote industrialization, and during the 1970s salvaged troubled
private enterprises. In addition, the State created businesses through various public programs to
stimulate entrepreneurship among grassroots organizations. For decades, growth and stability
were more important than profitability. Privatization in Mexico has become famous for its rapid
pace and broad scope. Over the past 10 years more than 430 public sector enterprises have been
sold, with most of the proceeds going into a "Contingency Fund." The government has used part
of the revenue for buybacks of outstanding foreign debt at a discount, and to retire part of the
sizable domestic debt. The most notable successes for buyers of privatized companies include
the telephone company (Telmex), and the commercial banking system. The sale of Telmex to a
consortium made up of a wily entrepreneur, Carlos Slim, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
and the France Cable and Radio Company is a saga yet to be fully revealed. This company not
only is among the most profitable in the world (US$1.1 billion profits on a net worth of US$3.9
billion in 1991), but has become the most heavily traded of the Mexican companies on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The banks were divvied up among the financial consortia owned
by Mexico's richest and most prominent families, and since the transfers of ownership, the banks
have been strengthened by a series of measures to increase the number of customers and bank
deposits. Privatization touches virtually every aspect of life in Mexico, reflecting the pervasiveness
of government intervention in the economy on the eve of the crisis. Public subsidies for productive
activities were an explicit part of Mexico's development strategy, since they permitted substantial
profits for private businesses which bought inexpensive goods and services from public enterprises.
Privatization, then, permitted and even obligated a sharp rise in the prices of these goods, seriously
affecting less privileged industries and consumers. The cost of local telephone service increased
dramatically with the introduction of measured service, while the nation's burgeoning private toll
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road system is among the most expensive per kilometer in the world. With the sale of the food
processing and distribution agency CONASUPO, many supermarkets in working class and marginal
areas were closed, some inexpensive goods disappeared, and the prices on others increased sharply.
Throughout the society, the privatization process, which is also extending throughout the rural
economy, and even to the heretofore sacrosanct petroleum industry, is providing an opportunity
for private entrepreneurs to further amass unprecedented economic and political control over the
domestic economy. 6) The concentration of capital. Rewards for Mexican business owners from
the new development and international integration strategy are fabulous. Workers' participation
in aggregate personal income declined from 36% in the mid-1970s to 25% in 1988. By 1992, this
figure had declined still further to 23%. The Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) reports that less than
8,000 accounts including about 1,500 owned by foreigners control more than 94% of the total value
of publicly held stock. This centralization of wealth aroused the admiration of the foreign press.
Business Week (29/VII/91) identified five members of a "protected plutocracy" described in the
article as President Salinas' "cronies" who have benefited handsomely from the neo-liberal reform
package. More recently, Forbes (20/VII/92) placed the five and two other Mexicans among the 289
richest people in the world, whose family worth is greater than US$1 billion each. 7) The Mexican
Stock Exchange (BMV) and the role of foreign capital. The BMV currently plays a very special role
in Mexican economic affairs. In spite of the fact that so few people can afford to invest in the market,
the government has attached a great deal of importance to fluctuations in stock prices, and the
government development bank, Nacional Financiera, plays a major role in attempting to ensure an
orderly market through transactions executed by its Mexico Fund. As more shares are cross listed on
the NYSE (American Depository Receipts-ADRs), the influence of international political events and
political uncertainty surrounding the NAFTA add instability to the market, which makes investment
even more speculative and unpredictable. Foreign capital plays an increasingly dominant role.
Government figures show that foreign investment is increasing by leaps and bounds, but most
is not linked to any particular investment project. Even direct investment is concentrating in the
commercial and services sectors, propagating various types of franchise operations and implanting
US styles of merchandising which are destroying local businesses. Outside of the computer and
automobile industries, very little is directed to new productive facilities in manufacturing. Foreign
investors are well rewarded, especially when they do not make productive investments! During
1991, almost US$20 billion took advantage of Mexico's new opening to feed a spectacular stock
market boom. The Mexican business environment was particularly congenial, not simply because
the BMV index doubled during the year, but also because there is no effective capital gains reporting
or taxation mechanism. In mid-1992, when stock prices began to stagnate, domestic interest rates for
passive investments were still almost three times the prevailing prime rate in the US. At that time,
20% of the total value of securities was concentrated in a very small number of foreign accounts.
8) Public sector restructuring. The trimming down of the public sector and the redirection of
programs to promote the interests of capital are prime objectives of the present regime. Many
state-run companies that operated at a deficit were eliminated, public services were cut back, and
user charges raised substantially. On the revenue side, tax collection is being redesigned, and
new groups drawn into the ranks of taxpayers. The changes in regulations are so frequent and
complex, that a new insurgent taxpayer movement charges the government with "fiscal terrorism."
The cutbacks in the bureaucracy and public services for the working class and peasantry are not
simply measures to deliver the existing social wage more efficiently. They represent deep cuts in
service levels and a deterioration in quality. The changes have been so profound that privileged
employees throughout the economy (including the government) are being offered supplementary
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private sector health insurance, educational and other benefits. The other substantial change on
the expenditure side has been the important reduction in the costs of debt service, both domestic
and foreign, as domestic interest rates fell, and part of the principal was retired or renegotiated. On
the revenue side, the surprising result of the changes is that taxes as a proportion of GDP have not
varied substantially over the past decade, nor has the government been willing or able to impose
heavy taxes on the main sources of personal enrichment since the policy changes of the 1980s. On
balance, then, the government has forcefully reoriented its entire program to benefit the rich and
shelter their incomes from taxation.

-- End --
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